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When deciding whether to allow a taking of property we need 
to ask what we want property rights to do 
 
Douglas C Harris*  
 
In 2017, the strata corporation at The Hampstead, a 4-storey apartment building in 
Vancouver’s West End, called a vote on a proposal to wind-up the strata 
corporation, terminate the individual strata lots, and convert the strata lot owners 
to co-owners of the whole. The catalyst for the vote was a developer’s offer that, if 
accepted, would see the owners receive more than twice the assessed value of their 
strata lots.1 The owners of 27 of the 33 strata lots voted in favour of dissolution. In 
another vote, they approved the collective sale.2 
The developer’s offer precipitated the dissolution vote, but other factors 
were involved, including the prospect of expensive renovations to the 30-year old 
building, the city’s decision to allow higher density developments in the 
neighbourhood,3 and the province’s amendment of the Strata Property Act to lower 
the approval threshold for dissolution votes from unanimous consent to 80 
percent.4 The Hampstead vote met this lower 80 percent threshold, by one vote. 
The reduced approval threshold facilitates the dissolution of strata property 
and, in doing so, enhances the capacity of owners, such as those at The Hampstead, 
to maximize the exchange value of their interests. However, abandoning the 
presumption that dissolution requires unanimous consent also makes it more likely 
that dissenting owners will have their property taken from them involuntarily. 
In recognition of the dangers inherent to a regime that enables a majority of 
owners to terminate the individual property interests of a dissenting minority, the 
Strata Property Act requires that strata corporations secure court confirmation of 
dissolution votes.5 Not surprisingly, the shift to a lower dissolution threshold, the 
rapidly rising land values in British Columbia’s urban centres, and the increased costs 
of maintaining aging buildings, have precipitated a growing number of dissolution 
votes and a steady flow of applications to the British Columbia Supreme Court 
(BCSC) to confirm the votes. 
The first two applications to confirm dissolution votes were uncontested, 
even though a number of owners had voted against dissolution in each instance.6 
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1 The Owners, Strata Plan VR2122 v Wake, 2017 BCSC 2386 [Wake] at para 18. 
2 Ibid at para 3. 
3 The City of Vancouver, West End Community Plan (20 November 2013), 52-54. 
4 Strata Property Act, SBC 1998, c 43, ss 272, 277. See Douglas C. Harris, “Owning and 
Dissolving Strata Property” (2017) 50:4 UBC L Rev 935, for detail on the statutory dissolution 
provisions and the early judicial interpretations of them. 
5 Ibid ss 273.1, 278.1 
6 The Owners, Strata Plan VR140 v Harrison (27 March 2017), Vancouver, BCSC S-1611558; 
The Owners, Strata Plan NW698 (28 March 2017) Vancouver, BCSC S-171277. 
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Since then, the BCSC has heard two contested applications. Justice Milman denied 
the first, ruling in an application from the strata corporation at Bel-Ayre Villa that a 
procedural flaw invalidated the vote.7 In doing so, he described non-consensual 
dissolution as “an involuntary taking of a home,” and ruled that statutes that 
authorize the taking of property must be interpreted strictly.8 In this case, the 
procedural failing, although apparently not causing prejudice to the dissenting 
owners, nullified the vote.9 Strata corporations had to follow the statutory 
requirements for dissolution to the letter because non-consensual dissolution 
produced a taking of property.10 
In the second contested application—that of the strata corporation at The 
Hampstead—Justice Loo confirmed the dissolution vote.11 In her reasons for 
decision, Justice Loo indicated that the statutory dissolution framework “balances 
various legal rights, so that property rights are not to be given priority over other 
legal rights.”12 She is correct that the courts must balance competing interests when 
considering contested strata property cases, but pitting “property rights” against 
“other legal rights” misconstrues the choice that confronts the courts. 
First, it is not clear what Justice Loo means by “other legal rights.” Strata 
property owners hold a private interest (usually a fee simple estate) in a separately 
identified parcel of land, a share of the common property, and a right to participate 
in the governance of the private and common property. This package of interests 
and an obligation to contribute to the maintenance of the common property are the 
essential features of strata property. The rights to participate in strata governance, 
including the capacity to vote on dissolution, are not “other legal rights” that need 
to be balanced against property rights; they are part of the strata property package. 
Similarly, the wish to maximize the exchange value of a property interest 
does not fall within the category of “other legal rights”. It is simply a desire that 
must be weighed against the desire to remain in a home. As a result, where 
dissenting owners contest the dissolution of strata property, the task for the court is 
to determine what the institution of property protects. Justice Loo comes closer to 
identifying the issue when she concludes: 
… I do not agree that property rights as a home should be given greater 
emphasis in the face of 80% or more of the owners who want to take 
advantage of the increased profit to be made as a result of rezoning and 
                                                     
7 The Owners, Strata Plan VR 1966, 2017 BCSC 1661.  
8 Ibid at para 41. 
9 Ibid at paras 36 and 42. 
10 See Douglas C Harris and Nicole Gilewicz, “Dissolving Condominium, Private Takings, and 
the Nature of Property” in B Hoops et al, eds, Rethinking Expropriation Law II: Context, 
Criteria, and Consequences of Expropriation (The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 
2015) 263 on non-consensual dissolution as a private-to-private taking of property. 
11 Wake, supra note 1. 
12 Ibid at para 131. 
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redevelopment, particularly when the preponderance of the evidence is 
that the owners who want to remain living in the community can do so.13 
The question in contested strata property dissolution cases is whether 
property rights in land protect “home” or the ability “to take advantage of the 
increased profit”. In the words of one of the owners, does The Hampstead provide 
him a “home for the rest of his life”,14 or is it, in the words of another, “a hugely 
valuable commodity”?15 
When courts grapple with this question, the Strata Property Act directs them 
to consider “the best interests of the owners” and whether confirming or not 
confirming the dissolution vote might cause “significant unfairness” or create 
“significant confusion and uncertainty.”16 In most cases, the first two 
considerations—“best interests” and “significant unfairness”—will require the 
closest judicial attention, and the analysis of these standards should begin with 
recognition that to confirm non-consensual dissolution is to authorize the capacity 
of a majority of owners to take the property of a dissenting minority. 
In considering “best interests”, if the starting point is that non-consensual 
dissolution results in the taking of property, then the courts should not simply 
equate “best interests” with “the greatest good for the greatest number.” The 
courts have generated the “greatest good for the greatest number” standard in 
disputes over the use and management of common property.17 While it may be an 
appropriate framework to resolve disputes over common property, the taking of 
individual interests in land requires more attention to individual circumstances and 
interests, particularly of those who confront involuntary dispossession and the loss 
of home. In short, the courts should not consider an 80 percent vote to have 
determined the best interests of the owners. It may be evidence of best interests, 
but should not be determinative. 
Turning to “significant unfairness”, if the non-consensual dissolution of strata 
property is understood to include a taking of property from dissenting owners, then 
courts should begin with the presumption that non-consensual dissolution creates 
significant unfairness. Indeed, the potential unfairness in the taking of property is 
the basis for the common law rule that statutes that authorize a taking must be 
strictly construed. This presumption of unfairness to a dissenting minority would 
place a burden on the proponents of dissolution to establish either that the taking 
would not create significant unfairness, or that not to allow the taking of property 
would create greater unfairness. 
Justice Loo’s conclusion, based principally it appears on evidence led by the 
proponents of dissolution at The Hampstead, that there would not be significant 
unfairness because the involuntarily dispossessed owners could purchase other 
property the same neighbourhood—“all of the owners should be able to acquire 
                                                     
13 Ibid at para 129. 
14 Ibid at para 56. 
15 Ibid at para 133. 
16 See Harris, “Owning and Dissolving Strata Property” supra note 4 at 952-63. 
17 Gentis v The Owners, Strata Plan VR 368, 2003 BCSC 120 at para 24. 
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comparable units in the West End”18—appears to recognize that the burden to 
establish unfairness will be shared. 
Non-consensual dissolution of strata property results in the taking of 
property from dissenting owners. This should be the starting point for the courts as 
they turn their attention to considerations of “best interest” and “significant 
unfairness” and, in the case of residential land, to the question of whether property 
rights should protect home or the capacity to maximize exchange value. 
In making this choice, the courts must be attentive to context. Indeed, 
determining “best interests” and “significant unfairness” requires attention to the 
circumstances of individual owners, and this necessarily involves consideration of 
context. At present, two factors should receive particular attention. 
First, the shift away from the presumption that dissolution required 
unanimous consent has fundamentally altered the terms of strata property 
ownership. At least in the near term, this significant and retroactive change should 
bear on how the courts interpret owner expectations. Justice Loo’s assertion that 
“[r]easonable expectations are not static,” and her conclusion that the owners at 
The Hampstead could not have “reasonably expected to live in their units as long as 
they wanted, or for the rest of their lives,” unduly minimizes the degree and 
significance of the shift in what it means to be an owner within strata property.19 
Before the amended dissolution provisions, it was entirely reasonable for strata 
property owners to expect that the termination of their strata lots required their 
consent. Non-consensual dissolution was possible, but difficult and rare. Indeed, this 
was a prominent justification for the lower dissolution vote threshold.20 The courts 
should not minimize the degree of the change, or suggest that prior, well-founded 
expectations were somehow unreasonable. 
Second, there is broad awareness that the rapidly rising cost of land in British 
Columbia’s urban centres, particularly Vancouver, has dramatically reduced the 
affordability of housing. There is much less agreement about whether the solutions 
to the affordability crisis lie in efforts to enhance the supply of housing, or to reduce 
land speculation, or both.21 However, while governments at different levels grapple 
with broad policy choices, the courts have a more clearly defined, yet nonetheless 
difficult choice in reviewing contested strata property dissolution votes: does 
ownership within strata property protect the capacity to remain an owner or to 
maximize the exchange value? In determining which construction of property is in 
the owners’ best interests and does not create significant unfairness, the courts 
must address the availability of affordable housing. At a minimum, the current crisis 
should give them pause before they move too quickly to countenance the taking of 
existing homes by confirming the non-consensual dissolution of strata property. 
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